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Symposium Introduction

The Future of the Independent
Counsel Statute: Confronting the
Dilemma of Allocating the Power
of Prosecutorial Discretion
by James P. Fleissner"
June 30, 1999. On that date, absent reauthorization, the Independent
Counsel Statute "shall cease to be effective."' This "sunset provision"
* Associate Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University.
Marquette University (B.A., 1979); University of Chicago Law School (J.D., 1986). Before
joining the Mercer faculty, the author was a federal prosecutor in Chicago from 1986 to
1994, last serving as Chief of the General Crimes Section of the United States Attorney's
Office. The author is grateful to the many people who assisted in organizing Mercer Law
School's Symposium on the Independent Counsel Statute. Professor John Q. Barrett
deserves special thanks for his advice and counsel throughout the process of putting the
program together, including his thoughtful comments on a draft of this Article. After this
Article was completed, the author was appointed Senior Associate Independent Counsel for
In re: Henry G. Cisneros. Any opinions expressed in the Article are exclusively the views
of the author in a private capacity.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 599 (Supp. 1997).
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was designed in part to ensure that affirmative legislative action,
informed by vigorous debate, will be required to extend the life of the
great national experiment that is the Independent Counsel Statute. The
debate over the statute is well under way, and the outcome of that
debate will greatly affect the course of American politics and government. The decision of whether to revert to the pre-independent counsel
scheme or to extend, amend, or replace the independent counsel
institution is a fundamental choice about the form of our government.
Although the debate concerns an institution created by statute, the
decision as to who shall wield prosecutorial power, a core executive
function, has significant implications for how our constitutional system
functions.
With sunset approaching for the Independent Counsel Statute, the
nation must confront the dilemma of allocating prosecutorial power. If
the power is vested in the Attorney General, there is a risk that the
power will be abused when the administration investigates allegations
against the President or other high ranking officials. This risk involves
the administration's receiving favorable treatment from a prosecutor
laboring under a conflict of interest. On the other hand, if the power is
vested in an independent prosecutor, there is a risk that the power will
be abused by an overly aggressive, unchecked, and perhaps politically
motivated prosecutor. This risk involves inappropriate use of the power
to investigate and indict by an unaccountable prosecutor.
The dilemma is inescapable. The need to confront the dilemma also
is inescapable. A choice must be made, even if that choice is to revert
to the pre-independent counsel status quo through legislative inaction.
The process of deciding on the allocation of prosecutorial power and
deciding on checks and balances is inevitably a process of compromise.
There is no way to engineer a perfect system. However, it is possible to
make informed choices concerning the design of the system for allocating
prosecutorial power. Which risks should be minimized? Which
tendencies should be encouraged?
Mercer University's Walter F. George School of Law and the Mercer
Law Review hosted a symposium on the Independent Counsel Statute
in the hope of making a small contribution to the national dialogue on
the future of the law. This edition of the Mercer Law Review is based
on those proceedings. On October 27, 1997, Mercer was host to two
panels of speakers with great insight into the issues. One panel was
comprised of Professor John Q. Barrett of St. John's University School
of Law, Professor Kathleen Clark of Washington University School of
Law, and Professor Katy J. Harriger of Wake Forest University's
Department of Politics. During the morning session of the Symposium,
entitled "Perspectives on the Independent Counsel Statute," Professors
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Barrett, Clark, and Harriger each made a presentation, offered
commentary on each others' ideas, and took questions from the audience.
Articles by each of these three scholars appear in this edition.
The afternoon session of the Symposium was "A Roundtable Discussion on the Independent Counsel Statute." The roundtable discussion,
which was held at the historic Douglass Theatre in Macon, featured four
distinguished participants: former United States Attorney General
Griffin B. Bell, former Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox,
former White House Counsel Lloyd N. Cutler, and former Iran-Contra
Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh. As the transcript of that
discussion reveals, these four gentlemen advanced divergent views on
many issues and shared common ground on others. Their discussion
should be a valuable resource as the debate over the Independent
Counsel Statute continues.
In this introduction to the Symposium, an effort is made to frame the
issues being debated. Part I offers some remarks about the nature of the
power at issue in the debate over the Independent Counsel Statute,
namely, the power of prosecutorial discretion. Part II expands on the
notion that the allocation of this power presents legislators with a
dilemma that forces difficult choices. Part III discusses the fact that the
current debate will be conducted in a highly politicized environment, a
reality that may cause political expediency to determine the outcome.
Part IV summarizes the views of the seven Symposium speakers,
examining how the recommendations of the speakers would strike the
balance between the competing halves of the discretion dilemma.
I.

THE POWER AT ISSUE: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

The importance of the independent counsel debate flows from the
importance of the power at stake: the power of the executive branch to
exercise prosecutorial discretion. The Supreme Court has stated: "The
Attorney General and the United States Attorneys retain 'broad
discretion' to enforce the Nation's criminal laws. They have this latitude
because they are designated by statute as the President's delegates to
help him discharge his Constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that
the Laws be faithfdly executed. '"'2 The Independent Counsel Statute,
when triggered, transfers the executive branch's prosecutorial discretion

2. United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996) (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
11, § 3). The prosecutor's decisions are accorded a presumption of regularity and judicial
deference unless there is clear evidence that the prosecutor's actions have impinged on
protected statutory or constitutional rights. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608
(1985).
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over the matter at issue to a different delegate, a court-appointed
independent counsel.'
The Supreme Court has rejected constitutional challenges to the
statute based on contentions that it violated separation of powers.4 The
Court rejected the claim that the statute impermissibly involved the
judiciary in executive matters by giving certain powers, such as the
appointment power, to a court. The Court also rejected the claim that
the statute improperly interfered with executive authority by limiting
the amount of control the President and Attorney General would have
over the independent counsel's prosecutorial discretion.'
Despite
upholding the statute, the Court acknowledged that "the degree of
control exercised by the Executive Branch over an independent counsel
is clearly diminished in relation to that exercised over other prosecutors."7 And so, under the Supreme Court's separation of powers
analysis, the independent counsel debate does not present an interbranch, constitutional separation of powers issue. Rather, the debate
presents an intra-branch, statutory allocation of power issue. And the
power at issue is a critical power of constitutional stature: the power of
prosecutorial discretion.
Whether held by the Attorney General or an independent counsel,
prosecutorial power is substantial and subject to few constraints. The
power has both affirmative and negative aspects. The prosecutor has
the power to investigate, to subpoena, to arrest, and to indict. A
prosecutor who aggressively uses the tools at his disposal, and perhaps
engages in sharp tactics, has immense power. As Attorney General
(later Justice) Robert Jackson said:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than
any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous .... With
the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor

3. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1993) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an independent counsel appointed
under this chapter shall have, with respect to all matters in such independent
counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction established under this chapter, full power and
independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and
powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer
or employee of the Department of Justice, except that the Attorney General shall
exercise direction or control as to those matters that specifically require the
Attorney General's personal action under section 2516 of title 18 [which requires
authorization by the Attorney General for certain electronic surveillance].
4. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
5. Id. at 684.
6. Id. at 695-96.
7. Id. at 696 n.34.
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stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical violation of some act
on the part of almost anyone. In such a case, it is not a question of
discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for the man
who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man and then
searching the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin some
offense on him. It is in this realm ... that the greatest danger of
abuse of prosecuting power lies.'
It is prosecutorial power in its affirmative aspect that is emphasized by
opponents and critics of the independent counsel. They fear an
unchecked prosecutor run amok.
The prosecutor also has the power not to investigate, not to subpoena,
not to arrest, and not to indict. The prosecutor may choose not to be
aggressive. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, an outspoken critic of the
vast discretion of prosecutors, said, "The affirmative power to prosecute
is enormous, but the negative power to withhold prosecution may even
be greater, because it is less protected against abuse."' Supporters of
the independent counsel are most concerned with this negative aspect of
prosecutorial power. They fear an unchecked prosecutor laboring under
a political conflict of interest who would sweep potential wrongdoing
under the rug or prosecute low level scapegoats while allowing those
most responsible off the hook. These competing fears over who will
exercise the executive's prosecutorial discretion both have a basis in
reality. The legitimacy of these fears gives rise to a dilemma for those
who must decide the future of the Independent Counsel Statute.
II.

THE DISCRETION DILEMMA

Should the institution of the independent counsel (or another
institution entrusted with similar discretion) be on the books after June
1999? If so, how should prosecutorial discretion be allocated between the
independent prosecutor and the Attorney General? Trying to answer
these questions presents a dilemma.
A.

DelegatingDiscretion to the Attorney General

If there is no independent prosecutor available, one half of the
dilemma presents itself. Without the Independent Counsel Statute, the
power of prosecutorial discretion is in the hands of the Attorney General
and, indirectly, the President. At the very least, there is a public
perception that an Attorney General who is beholden to the President

8. 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE Socy 18-19 (1940).
9. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188 (1971).
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cannot objectively evaluate the conduct of other high ranking officials.
Beyond mere perceptions, there is concern that the Attorney General
would convert the presumption of innocence into an almost irrebuttable
presumption. Even worse, the Attorney General is in a position to
undermine or obstruct effective investigation and prosecution.
In a conflict of interest situation, the Attorney General and others may
recuse themselves and delegate prosecutorial power to either a career
Department of Justice prosecutor or to an outsider. Of course, the
decision whether to make one of these arrangements is within the
Attorney General's discretion. If implemented, these arrangements can
relieve the conflict of interest, but the Attorney General has the
authority to choose the prosecutor, dictate the terms under which
authority is delegated, and terminate the appointment. The informal,
ad hoc delegation of an investigation to a career or special prosecutor
leaves critical elements of the prosecutorial power in the hands of the
Attorney General.
Of course, the Attorney General is beholden to an oath to uphold the
law even if the administration is hurt. But can we assume that
Attorneys General will always fulfill the trust placed in them? History
teaches that sometimes the assumption is unwarranted. Is it possible
that a well meaning Attorney General could be less than objective in
evaluating allegations of wrongdoing? Again, we are suspicious of
persons being the judge in their own case.
And if an Attorney General exercises prosecutorial power in its
negative aspect to the benefit of the administration, is there a sufficient
political check from public outcry and congressional pressure to assure
that the laws are faithfully executed? In the aftermath of President
Nixon's firing of Archibald Cox, political pressure forced the President
to appoint a new special prosecutor and to make other concessions. That
episode demonstrates that the political check can be potent. However,
the situation was unprecedented, and the force and effectiveness of the
public response may have been unique. In that case, the President fired
an ad hoc special prosecutor for transparently self-serving reasons.
Public outcry will be less effective when the administration's action is
less dramatic or the matter at issue less apparent.
The aftermath of the Cox firing was a democratic success story, but
public perception of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the
President and Attorney General in cases affecting the administration has
a dark side. Because there is a potential perception of a conflict of
interest, there are political incentives for the administration's opponents
to promote that perception. With the power to decide in the hands of the
Attorney General, any decision not to act will be portrayed as political
cronyism. Thus, the appearance of a conflict of interest when an
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administration "investigates itself" has a self-fulfilling quality because
political opponents naturally will be drawn to depict inaction as if the
fix is in.
It is often said that the issue here is the rule of law. On the day
'President Nixon fired him, Archibald Cox put the issue in those terms:
"Whether ours shall continue to be a government of laws and not of men
is now for Congress and ultimately the American people."'0 It is
accepted as gospel that the President and other government officials are
not, and should not be, above the law. Vesting prosecutorial discretion
in the Attorney General creates the risk that by exercising the power not
to act, the Attorney General will elevate suspected officials above the
law. And so, leaving the power with the Attorney General runs the risk
of abuse of the power through its negative aspect.
B. DelegatingDiscretion to an Independent Counsel
If an independent counsel or similar institution is adopted, the risk of
abuse of prosecutorial power in its negative aspect is curtailed. Under
this scheme, discretion is vested in a prosecutor who is neither chosen
by nor beholden to the administration. The executive's prosecutorial
power is delegated to someone insulated from both interference from the
administration and congressional encroachment on the power. Because
the Independent Counsel Statute is the status quo, this discussion will
focus on that institutional scheme."
The insulation of the independent counsel creates the other half of the
discretion dilemma: the risk of the abuse of prosecutorial power in its
positive aspect. Vesting the enormous prosecutorial authority in an
independent counsel with few checks or limits and virtually unlimited
resources creates the risk of subjecting those investigated to a different
level of scrutiny and pursuit than an ordinary citizen might face.
Under the existing Independent Counsel Statute, the power of
prosecutorial discretion is transferred from the Attorney General to the
independent counsel when the law is triggered. The triggering
mechanism has two phases. First, the Attorney General determines the
need for a preliminary investigation. 2 In this phase the Attorney
General has thirty days to determine whether an allegation is "specific
and from a credible source."'
The statute restricts the Attorney

10. See KEN
11.

GORwLEY, ARCHIBALD Cox: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 358 (1997).

For a comprehensive critique of the Independent Counsel Statute, see Julie

O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
463 (1996).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 591 (c) (Supp. 1997).

13. Id. § 591(d) (2).
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General to consideration of the specificity of the information and the
credibility of the source. 14 In making this determination, the Attorney
General is prohibited from considering the criminal intent of the
accused."6
If the "specific information and credible source" determination is made,
the preliminary investigation begins. This phase requires a decision
within ninety days unless a sixty-day extension is granted.16 During
the preliminary investigation, the Attorney General's discretion is
greatly restricted. The Attorney General is denied authority "to convene
grand juries, plea bargain, grant immunity, or issue subpoenas. " 17 The
standard in this phase is whether there are "no reasonable grounds to
believe that further investigation is warranted."'
The Attorney
General may not refuse to request an independent counsel based on a
lack of criminal intent on the part of the accused unless the lack of
criminal intent is established by clear and convincing evidence.' 9
Obviously, the triggering mechanism has a very low threshold. Indeed,
the statute's formula is a recipe for referral: it denies the Attorney
General the most basic investigative techniques and then requires
referral if further investigation is warranted. Although the statute says
the Attorney General's decision not to request an independent counsel
is not reviewable in the courts,2" the Attorney General's discretion
ultimately is restricted by the minimal threshold of the triggering
mechanism. Notwithstanding the provision limiting judicial review, one
commentator has suggested that the courts might still be able to check
the Attorney General's discretion.2 That same commentator would like
to see judicial review of the Attorney General's referral decision made
explicit in any future independent counsel law.'
Once the Attorney General requests an independent counsel, the
Special Division of United, States Court of Appeals appoints the
independent counsel." After the power over a matter is vested in the
independent counsel, there are very few formal constraints. Consider
the controls available to the President and Attorney General. Although

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. § 592(a)(2)(B)(i).
Id. § 592(a)(3).
I& § 592(aX2).
Id. § 592(bX).
Id. § 592(aX2XB)(ii).
Id. § 592(f).
John F. Banzhaf, III, Upset at Reno's Decision: Take Her to Court, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REPORT, Dec. 12, 1997, at 7.
22. I

23. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(1) (1993).
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the independent counsel is limited to the four corners of his jurisdictional charter, the law allows for expansion of the jurisdictional grant,"
and experience has shown that independent counsel often expand their
probes to related matters." The statute states that the independent
counsel is supposed to follow Department of Justice policies2' and file
periodic reports on expenditures,2 7 but these provisions are hardly
fetters. And the removal of an independent counsel by the Attorney
General under the provision authorizing the removal for "good cause2
is, because of the memory of Nixon's firing of Archibald Cox, very
unlikely to happen.
The congressional oversight and reporting provisions2 9 are also weak
control mechanisms. The prospect of removing an independent counsel
by impeachment and conviction"0 is remote. Indeed, the Supreme
Court upheld the statute against separation of powers challenges in part
because "Congress retained for itself no powers of control or supervision
over an independent counsel." 1
With so few institutional checks on the independent counsel, should
we trust that the appointment of persons of great stature and sterling
integrity will prevent abuses? The independent counsel also takes an
oath to uphold the law. In the case of the Attorney General, we may
want to have an institutional mechanism to curb the discretion to
exercise power by failing to act. In that case, there is identified a
potential motive or bias on the part of the Attorney General to favor the
administration. There is a conflict of interest: the interest in effective,
impartial prosecution conflicts with the interest of loyalty to the
administration. Is there a mirror-image concern with independent
counsel? Is there a similar need for institutional checks on the
independent counsel to prevent abuse of prosecutorial power through
action?
Defenders of the institution of the independent counsel play down the
need for additional institutional checks. Defenders emphasize that
independent counsel are not political appointees and start without
loyalty to or bias against anyone. Independence and impartiality are
part and parcel of their statutory role. Defenders would point out that

24.
25.

Id. § 594(e).
See O'Sullivan, supra note 11, at 485-88.

26. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
27. Id § 594(h).
28. Id.

§ 596(a).

29. Id. § 595(a).
30. See id. § 596(a)(1).
31. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694.
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the existing institutional checks, such as the limits of the jurisdictional
grant and the requirement that Department of Justice guidelines be
followed, are not without effect.'2 More significantly, defenders claim
that independent counsel are checked informally by resistance on many
fronts, including resistance by the administration, and that providing
additional institutional control mechanisms will provide additional
means for undermining the independence of the investigations." When
all the formal and informal checks are considered, defenders contend
that independent counsel are accountable and in reality are interdependent counsel.'
Critics of the independent counsel law believe that additional checks
are needed. Critics claim that independent counsel, like Attorneys
General, are subject to "motivational problems." It is possible that an
independent counsel may be moved to action by political motives.
Certainly these allegations are regularly leveled at independent counsel.
It is also possible that political persuasion might cause a well meaning
independent counsel to be less than objective in evaluating the merits of
taking investigative or prosecutorial action. Although independent
counsel are not to assume there is a viable prosecution, critics say that
the current system tempts independent counsel to go to extraordinary
lengths to assure themselves that there is no case before closing up shop.
The structure of the current statute makes independent counsel
particularly susceptible to the temptation to take actions ordinary
prosecutors would not take. The ordinary pressures of caseloads and
resource limits are not present. The only time limit is the statute of
limitations.3" Resource usage must be reported, but there is no real
constraint on spending. Indeed, independent counsel may earn outside
income, so there is not the usual financial sacrifice that might encourage
them not to drag out their public service.'

32.

See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FREWALL: THE IRAN-CONTRA CONSPIRACY AND

COvER-UP 526 (1997).
33. See John Q. Barrett, All or Nothing, or Maybe Cooperation: Attorney General
Power, Conduct, and Judgment in Relation to the Work of an Independent Counsel, 49
MERCER L. REV. 519 (1998); Symposium, A Roundtable Discussion on the Independent
Counsel Statute, 49 MERCER L. REV. 453, 474-76 (1998) (statements by Judge Walsh).
34. See KATYJ. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

INAMERICAN POLITICS 140-67 (1992).
35. However, some persons are covered by the statute only during the incumbency of
the President or for a limited period after leaving office. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(6), (7)
(Supp. 1997).
36. Lawyer of the Year: Kenneth W. Starr, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 30, 1996, at B12 (reporting
on Independent Counsel Starr's private clients and $956,601 in outside income in 1995);
Starr's Busy, ProfitableLife, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 23, 1995, at 19.
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Furthermore, an independent counsel may apply a more expansive
standard in determining what constitutes an appropriate use of
prosecutorial power. Attorney General Janet Reno is fond of saying that
she makes prosecutorial decisions based on "the facts and the law." 7
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr has echoed that remark." If those
are the only criteria, with enough resources and time, one might expect
a prosecutor to find some allegation that could be proved at trial. Once
begun, an investigation can take on a self-perpetuating quality: If
anyone linked to the subject of the investigation may be prosecuted on
the "facts and the law," then prosecuting that person might lead to a
deal for information on the subject.
Of course, prosecutorial decisions are more complex than the facts and
law template suggests. There are issues of lateral justice and policy and
ethics and economics. But independent counsel are less constrained by
these other factors in deciding not to continue an investigation, not to
use available investigative tactics, not to bring potential charges against
the suspect or others who might have information, and not to throw good
money after bad. Using prosecutorial power in its positive aspect
suggests thoroughness, justifies one's existence and efforts, allows for an
exhaustive final report, 9 and underscores the role of the independent
counsel as protector of the rule of law over men. Investigations can
gather momentum and be hard to stop. This may be true even if the
independent counsel finds little evidence of wrongdoing but wants an
exhaustive investigation to vindicate the suspect thoroughly.
Given the limited institutional checks on the independent counsel,
what of the check of public opinion? Certainly independent counsel
operate under the glare of the press, especially in presidential-level
cases. The defenders of those being investigated by independent counsel
have tried mightily to use the check of public opinion. Independent
counsel have been vilified and demonized as out of control political
partisans. When Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh informed
attorney Robert Bennett that his client, Caspar Weinberger, would be
indicted, Bennett responded by stating that "this means nuclear war.' °
What he meant, of course, was that an all out political and personal
attack would be launched against the independent counsel. The same

37. See, e.g., David Johnson, The Attorney General's Decision: The Overview, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 3, 1997, at A2.
38. See Marc Lacey, White House Attacks Starr Over Inquiry, LA. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 1998,
at A15.

39. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(h).
40. WALSH, supra note 32, at 410.
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sort of offensive strategic doctrine is on display as Mr. Bennett's current
client, President Clinton, faces an independent counsel.
Those attacking the independent counsel try to turn the powers and
resources of the office into a vulnerability. The attackers want the
public to condemn the independent counsel as conducting a witch hunt.
The public may ask, "Why is it taking so long and costing so much with
so few positive results?" The dynamic of extended independent counsel
investigations may well cause the defenders of suspects to denounce the
length of the investigation while dragging out the process.
Recent experience casts doubt on whether this political pressure can
check independent counsel. What is indisputable is that the inevitable
public relations attacks on independent counsel undermine one of the
purposes of having independent counsel at all: to create public
confidence in the impartial exercise of prosecutorial power. Indeed, an
independent counsel under attack may come to view the situation as a
war, as "us versus them." The independent counsel may wage a public
relations counter-offensive denouncing the denouncers. Aggressive
prosecutorial actions, in turn, become more evidence for the critics. It
is clear that this cycle of public relations attack and defense will
continue to occur often when prosecutorial power is given to an
independent counsel.
As has been noted, giving the power of prosecutorial discretion to an
independent counsel is often justified as promoting the rule of law.
Advocates of the independent counsel concept say that we want to be a
nation "of laws and not men." This translates as follows: "If the
President can break the law and not be held accountable, then the
President rules, not the law. If the President is held accountable for
breaking the law, then the law rules, not the President." The type of
government we have is thought of in the disjunctive: we have either a
government of laws or men. In thinking about what I have termed the
discretion dilemma and the problem of allocating the power of prosecutorial discretion, it may be useful to consider the conjunction of law and
men in government. As Kenneth Culp Davis wrote:
No government has ever been a government of laws and not men in the
sense of eliminating all discretionary power. Every government has
always been a government of laws and of men. A close look at the
meaning of Aristotle, the first user of the phrase "government of laws
and not of men," shows quite clearly that he did not mean that
governments could exist without discretionary power.41

41. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 17 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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Thus, while we celebrate the principle of the rule of law over man, we
must recognize the role of man in administering the law. The dilemma
of how to allocate the power of prosecutorial discretion involves both of
these notions. Certainly it is desirable to hold our highest officials
accountable to the law. In deciding how to design the prosecutorial
mechanism for achieving this end, we must carefully choose between the
risk of a prosecutor whose conflict of interest might cause inaction when
action is justified and the risk of a prosecutor whose independence might
lead to action when inaction is the better course.
The current independent counsel scheme represents a choice in the
face of the discretion dilemma. The current statute controls the
Attorney General's discretion and limits the conflict of interest problem
at the risk of potentially unwise and unchecked exercises of prosecutorial
discretion in its positive aspect. This choice affirms the importance of
the rule of law and the idea that public officials are not above the law.
The current approach gives the independent counsel great discretion
with few checks. If an unwarranted prosecution is brought, at least the
courts can prevent injustice. As for the use of affirmative prosecutorial
power short of the lodging of charges, the risks are deemed outweighed
by the potential evil of an Attorney General refusing to hold high
ranking officials accountable. This choice of evils is consistent with the
previously quoted assessment of Kenneth Culp Davis: "The affirmative
power to prosecute is enormous, but the negative power to withhold
prosecution may even be greater, because it is less protected against
abuse."42 Thus, the current independent counsel scheme strikes the
balance between the competing halves of the discretion dilemma by
erring on the side of preventing the abuse of power by inaction and
risking the abuse of power through action.
III.

POLITICS AND THE FUTURE OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
STATUTE

The debate over the Independent Counsel Statute should be about the
public good. As Alexander Hamilton said about debate over ratification
of the Constitution, "Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by
a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by
considerations not connected with the public good." 8 On this score,
Hamilton was hardly sanguine. He continued:

42. Id. at 188.
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
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But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be
expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many
particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to
involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and
of views, passions, and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of
truth."
So it will be with the independent counsel debate.
The process of deciding the future of the Independent Counsel Statute
is inevitably bound up with politics. When the Republicans held the
presidency, independent counsel were portrayed as tools of the political
left. The complaints were most shrill when investigations got close to
the President himself. For example, during the Iran-Contra investigation, Senator Robert Dole responded to the indictment of Caspar
Weinberger by denouncing Independent Counsel Walsh and "'his highly
paid assassins'" and accusing the independent counsel of attempting to
"'blackmail'" Weinberger into testifying against President Reagan.4
Senator Dole, an ardent opponent of the Independent Counsel Statute,
expressed his view in these terms: "In far too many instances, the
investigations by independent counsels have turned out to be partisan
political fishing expeditions-expeditions which have accomplished
In 1992 when the
nothing more than wasting millions of tax dollars.'
Independent Counsel Statute was up for reauthorization, Senate
Republicans blocked the legislation, and the statute lapsed. 47
In 1994, with a Democratic President in office, Congress reauthorized
the statute. On June 30, 1994, President Clinton signed the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act. Upon signing the act into law,
President Clinton made a statement that, in retrospect, truly is
remarkable:
I am pleased to sign into law.., the reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Act. This law, originally passed in 1978, is a foundation
stone for the trust between the Government and our citizens. It
ensures that no matter what party controls the Congress or the
executive branch, an independent, nonpartisan process will be in place
to guarantee the integrity of public officials and ensure that no one is
above the law. Regrettably, this statute was permitted to lapse when
its reauthorization became mired in a partisan dispute in the Congress.
Opponents called it a tool of partisan attack against Republican
Presidents and a waste of taxpayer funds. It was neither. In fact, the

44. Id.
45. WALSH, supra note 32, at 417 (quoting Senator Robert Dole).
46, Id. at 429.
47. 7 CQ RESEARCHER 155 (Feb. 1977).
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independent counsel statute has been in the past and is today a force
for government integrity and public confidence."
Time tells. After the President and his administration were subjected
to the rigors of several independent counsel investigations, President
Clinton's view of the law changed. It has been reported that when he
sat down for a chat with Senator Dole after the 1996 election, the
President had this to say to the man who had fought the reauthorization
of the Independent Counsel Statute: "You were right and I was wrong
on the independent counsel."'
Now that Republicans and Democrats have each suffered the political
sting of being subject to investigation by independent counsel, will there
be a bipartisan consensus that the Independent Counsel Statute should
be allowed to lapse? If a consensus forms, will it be based on sound
policy grounds or shear political calculation? Or will ambivalent feelings
on both sides of the aisle preclude the formation of any consensus
regarding the best path to take? It seems possible that the law will
lapse not because of a reasoned judgment that it would be best for the
country, but because of political stalemate and gridlock. It may be
policymaking by default. If that happens, the issue inevitably will arise
again the first time scandal hits the next administration, be it Republican or Democratic. Putting off the development of a consensus on the
critical policy issue of how best to allocate prosecutorial discretion will
only serve to further politicize the process when the issue recurs.
On a more optimistic note, perhaps the fact that both the Republican
and Democratic oxen have been gored will help Congress to address the
issues in a more detached, less political manner. As the debate over the
Independent Counsel Statute proceeds, the focus should be on determining what is in the national interest. Of course, partisan political
considerations will taint the process to some extent, but it is vital that
those involved in the process ultimately rise above political considerations on an issue of such great importance to the nation. The dilemma
of allocating prosecutorial power must be confronted. Every effort must
be made to choose a course of action on the merits.
IV.

PERSPECTIVES ON THE DISCRETION DILEMMA: THE VIEWS OF THE
SYMPOSIUM PARTICIPANTS

The seven symposium participants represent a diversity of views
concerning how the nation should confront the dilemma of allocating

48. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270 (statement
by President of the United States, June 30, 1994).
49. BOB WOODWARD, THE CHOICE: HOW CLINTON WON 443-44 (1997).
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prosecutorial discretion in cases involving allegations against high
ranking government officials of the executive branch. The perspectives
of the participants present a range of priorities and options for the
future of the Independent Counsel Statute.
Katy J. Harriger Professor Harriger describes and illuminates the
discretion dilemma and puts the current debate over the Independent
Counsel Statute in historical context.5" She emphasizes that the
choices concerning the balance of "the competing values of independence
and accountability" are as difficult now as ever."' Professor Harriger
traces the use of ad hoc special prosecutors before Watergate, the
development of the original version of the Independent Counsel Statute
after Watergate, and the fine tuning of the statutory scheme during the
reauthorizations of 1982, 1987, and 1994.52 In the original version of
the statute, "Congress opted to weigh in on the side of independence.
As Professor Harriger points out, the original version gave the Attorney
General almost no discretion in deciding whether to request an
independent counsel after allegations were made (a "hair trigger"),
barred the use of compulsory process to assist in the decision whether
to request an appointment, denied the Attorney General the discretion
to name the independent counsel, and allowed the Attorney General to
dismiss an independent counsel only for "extraordinary impropriety.' 4
Obviously, the original version of the statute was designed first and
foremost to check the abuse of prosecutorial discretion in its negative
aspect.
Professor Harriger describes how changes to the original Independent
Counsel Statute re-allocated discretion between the Attorney General
and the independent counsel. One example is the threshold for
triggering the statute, which at first was changed to expand the
discretion of the Attorney General, allowing consideration of the
specificity of allegations and credibility of the source.55 Later, the
allocation of discretion was changed again by limiting the ability of the
Attorney General to refuse to refer a matter based on the suspect's
innocent "state of mind" to cases in which the evidence on that score is
M
clear and convincing."
With respect to other parts of the independent

50. Katy J. Harriger, The Historyof the Independent CounselProvisions:How the Past
Informs the CurrentDebate, 49 MERCER L. REV. 489 (1998).
51. Id. at 490.
52. Id. at 490-514.
53. Id. at 505.
54. Id. at 504-05.
55. Id. at 507-08.

56. Id. at 510.
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counsel scheme, such as the vesting of the power to appoint in a panel
of judges, the original limitations on the Attorney General's discretion
have been maintained.
Professor Harriger sets the stage for the confrontation of the discretion
dilemma in the current reauthorization cycle. She stresses that the
allocation of discretion involves inevitable trade-offs. She poses the
question: "Can independent prosecution coexist with executive branch
accountability mechanisms?"57 In answer to this question, Professor
Harriger noted the trade-offs and stated, "Some delicate balance must
be struck and then found to be acceptable as the least flawed of the
available alternatives." 8 However, Professor Harriger warns that the
answer to the question may be no, citing the perceived failure of the
Independent Counsel Statute to achieve its goals. Other than the
current version of the Independent Counsel Statute, Professor Harriger
sees two plausible alternatives: a return to a "hair trigger" that restricts
the Attorney General's discretion to request an independent counsel, or
a return to the pre-independent counsel status quo, restoring discretion
in the Attorney General.59 According to Professor Harriger, neither of
these "seems as acceptable as the current arrangement, however
flawed.' °
John Q. Barrett. Professor Barrett, who served as Associate Independent Counsel during the Iran-Contra investigation, focuses on the
relationship between the Attorney General and an appointed independent counsel.61 As the current Independent Counsel Statute has been
interpreted, the Attorney General retains the power to exercise
discretion over several matters that may directly affect the ability of the
independent counsel to successfully investigate and prosecute. Professor
Barrett identified three powers retained by the Attorney General: the
power to decide whether to provide legal advice and representation to
various agencies within the executive branch, the power to decide
whether classified information may be used as evidence pursuant to the
Classified Information Procedures Act,62 and the power to deploy the

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 514.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 516.
Id. at 515.

61. John Q. Barrett, All or Nothing, or Maybe Cooperation: Attorney General Power,
Conduct, and Judgment in Relation to the Work of an Independent Counsel, 49 MERcER L.
REv. 519 (1998).
62. Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980)
(codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (1985 & Supp. 1998)).
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influence of the Solicitor General in litigation.'
Under current
practice, an Attorney General may provide the legal advice and
representation of the Department of Justice to executive branch agencies
who are at odds with the independent counsel. An Attorney General
may influence the Solicitor General to weigh in against an independent
counsel or, more likely, withhold support from the independent counsel.
And in cases in which access to classified information is necessary, the
Attorney General has the power to deny access to the needed information." With respect to the discretionary exercise of these powers, each
of which can directly affect the independent counsel's work, the Attorney
General retains the ability to undermine and possibly derail a meritorious criminal prosecution.
The Attorney General's role regarding classified information provides
a clear example of how the discretion retained by the Attorney General
provides the power to prevent the prosecution of covered individuals. As
Professor Barrett points out, the Attorney General's exercise of discretion
under the Classified Information Procedures Act can give the Attorney
General substantial power to block an independent counsel." In the
Iran-Contra affair, Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh was forced
to dismiss key charges against Oliver North because the Attorney
General balked at releasing certain classified information.' In another
case, the prosecution of Joseph Fernandez, the Attorney General refused
to release classified information, and the entire case was dismissed. 7
Thus, the Attorney General retains the discretion to thwart an
independent counsel. The Attorney General, of course, would defend the
correctness of his classified information rulings. But the fact remains
that current practice under the Independent Counsel Statute gives the
Attorney General the discretion to block a prosecution, thereby
exercising prosecutorial power in its negative aspect. As Professor
Barrett concludes, "This is at odds with the fundamental purpose and
the general provisions of the independent counsel law itself.'
Professor Barrett suggests that the Independent Counsel Statute
might be modified to explicitly empower the independent counsel with
respect to the classified information issue and dis-empower the Attorney
General with respect to the deployment of the legal resources of the
Department of Justice on independent counsel matters. 9 Interestingly,

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Barrett, supra note 61, at 529-31.
Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 536-37.
WALSH, supra note 32, at 175-81.
Id. at 218-19.
Barrett, supra note 61, at 537.
Id. at 541-42.
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Professor Barrett suggests that amending the law may not be necessary
because the Attorney General's discretionary power in these areas is
transferred to the independent counsel under the existing law although
no independent counsel has forced the issue.7
Whatever the route to an empowered independent counsel, Professor
Barrett contends that one effect will be to eliminate the ability of the
Attorney General to undercut the prosecutorial power of the independent
counsel quietly using low-profile methods such as withholding classified
information and providing legal support to persons or entities opposing
the investigation. An empowered independent counsel would require
showdowns between the administration and the independent counsel to
be conducted in the open with the administration limited to using the
methods clearly granted by the statute, such as firing the independent
counsel for good cause." In other words, the administration would be
forced to duel the independent counsel in full view using traditional
weapons, just7 2like the confrontation between President Nixon and

Archibald Cox.

Kathleen Clark. Professor Kathleen Clark's article focuses on a
proposal for a new ethics-in-government institution that might complement the Independent Counsel Statute or, if the statute lapses,
complement the Attorney General. That institution is an inspector
general for the White House.78 Professor Clark describes the primary
roles of an inspector general, an institution that has been established in
many departments of the government.74 Inspectors general investigate
allegations of wrongdoing, conduct regular audits, recommend new ways
of improving the department's operation, and report periodically to
Congress.7 ' Professor Clark contends that a White House inspector
general very well might prevent scandals or limit the size of scandals by
discovering wrongdoing and improving poor procedures that might create
opportunities for real or perceived wrongdoing.7
Of course, Professor Clark acknowledges that criminal investigations
and prosecutions will often be appropriate.77 However, as Professor
Clark points out, an effective inspector general may well reduce the
70. Id. at 542.
71. Id. at 547-48.
72. Id. at 548-51.
73. Kathleen Clark, Toward More Ethical Government: An Inspector General for the
White House, 49 MERCER. L. REV. 553 (1998).
74. Id. at 560.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 563.
77. Id.
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number of occasions in which a criminal investigation is needed.7
While not resolving the discretion dilemma, the inspector general
mechanism should reduce the number of cases in which the alternative
dangers of inaction by a partial Attorney General or action by a runaway
independent counsel must be confronted. Furthermore, it is possible
that the Independent Counsel Statute will be allowed to lapse, which
will return the power of prosecutorial discretion to the Attorney General
in cases involving high ranking officials in the White House. Professor
Clark argues that if that happens, there will be an "even greater need
for increased accountability in the White House."79 An inspector
general may serve to help fill that need.
Griffin B. Bell. Former Attorney General Griffin B. Bell is steadfast
in the belief that the independent counsel experiment has been a
failure.8' His approach to the discretion dilemma would be to restore
prosecutorial discretion to the Attorney General. When allegations are
made against high ranking officials and a conflict of interest appears,
Judge Bell favors two approaches, both involving the recusal of the
Attorney General and any others affected by the conflict. One would be
to allow authority to vest in career prosecutors within the Justice
Department. The other would be ad hoc appointment of a special
prosecutor, who would be appointed and empowered by the Attorney
General. sl
Judge Bell prefers to try to restore confidence in the Department of
Justice rather than replace the Department with the institution of the
independent counsel. As he said, "We need to trust our institutions and
hold our institutions accountable. If we will do that, we have plenty of
institutions. We just need to make sure they work well. 2 In recommending a return to the pre-independent counsel allocation of prosecutorial discretion, Judge Bell decries the unfairness of the independent
counsel process, which subjects public officials to more intense and
public scrutiny than other citizens." Thus, Judge Bell questions the
very premise of the Independent Counsel Statute-the belief that the
risk of inaction by an Attorney General outweighs the risk of inappropriate action by an unchecked independent counsel.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
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In the event that the Independent Counsel Statute is renewed over his
objection, Judge Bell would support a number of changes, including
increasing the discretion of the Attorney General with respect to the
decision of whether an independent counsel is needed. 8 Judge Bell
also endorsed the idea of allocating to the President some discretion in
the selection of the independent counsel through the nomination of a
standing panel of potential independent counsel subject to confirmation
by the Senate. 5 Thus, Judge Bell would significantly rework the
statutory scheme to give more discretion to the administration with
respect to the decision to seek an independent counsel. But his first
choice is to scrap the statute altogether.
Archibald Cox. Former Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox
favors retention of the Independent Counsel Statute but with "radical
changes."'
Professor Cox would significantly limit the number of
officials covered by the statute so that the law would apply only to the
President, Vice-President, and several other key administration
officials.8 7 He would also limit the subject matter of independent
counsel cases to allegations of serious criminal activity committed while
in office or seeking office." Professor Cox favors a somewhat higher
triggering standard than the current "whether further investigation is
warranted" standard, but does not favor a standard requiring as much
as probable cause."9 Professor Cox also favors a one year time limit for
independent counsel investigations, subject to extensions granted by a
court.90

Professor Cox's recommendations indeed would constitute radical
change. He would leave prosecutorial discretion with the Attorney
General, except for cases involving criminal misconduct by the President
and a handful of other officials. For cases involving lesser officials or
allegations of improper conduct that do not relate to obtaining or holding
office, discretion would remain with the Attorney General, who
presumably would decide to handle the case or delegate the case to
career prosecutors or an ad hoc special prosecutor.

84. Id. at 469-70 (statement of Mr. Cutler; Id. at 472-73 (Judge Bell's concurrence).
85. Id. at 478.
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Symposium, supra note 33, at 468.
Id. at 468, 473-74.
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Id. at 471-72.
Id. at 474.
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Professor Cox decries the politicization of the current Independent
Counsel Statute.9 He contends that the statute has come to be viewed
as a political tool allowing a prosecutor to be unleashed to "hunt"
administration officials against whom allegations have been leveled.'
In terms of the discretion dilemma, Professor Cox focuses on the abuse
of prosecutorial power in its positive aspect. Independent counsel,
cheered on by the administration's political opponents, are perceived as
hunters by the public and may perceive themselves as hunters. And, of
course, hunters like trophies. To Professor Cox, the current mentality
is at odds with the true purpose for the institution of an independent
counsel. Professor Cox sees the true purpose as providing a mechanism
for the rare episode when allegations against the highest officials of the
government require an "independent counsel of great fairness and
stature" as "the only way to assure the public of a truly impartial, fairminded investigation and finding."93 Under this view, prosecution
should not be the presumed task of an independent counsel.' Professor Cox sees such a presumption at work under the current law with
unfortunate results.
Professor Cox would preserve the independent counsel mechanism for
presidential-level investigations such as Watergate. In these cases,
however, even an independent counsel who is completely impartial will
almost certainly be viewed by the White House as a partisan bent on
bringing down the administration. At the Symposium, Professor Cox
maintained that he genuinely would have preferred to clear the
President.95 He was not on a hunt, but Professor Cox acknowledged
that President Nixon would never have believed it." Indeed, he did
not. Richard Nixon wrote in his memoirs, "If [Attorney General]
Richardson had searched specifically for the man whom I would have
least trusted to conduct so politically sensitive an investigation in an
unbiased way, he could hardly have done better than choose Archibald
Cox."97 Richard Nixon wrote that Archibald Cox and his staff were
"partisan zealots abusing the power I had given them in order to destroy
me unfairly.. .." To Nixon, firing Cox "seemed the only way to rid
the administration of the partisan viper we had planted in our bos-

91.
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om."'
Nixon concluded "that Cox had deliberately exceeded his
authority; I felt that he was trying to get me personally, and I wanted
him out.""°° Nixon obviously believed Cox was on a hunt. During the
roundtable discussion, Professor Cox poignantly described his showdown
with President Nixon over the tapes and his anguish over how the
confrontation would affect the rule of law. 1 Of course, Nixon fired
Cox, and the crisis created the impetus for the Independent Counsel
Statute. The attitude of President Nixon toward the investigation into
his activities clearly illustrates the risk of vesting the power of
prosecutorial discretion in the Attorney General and the President in
cases in which the administration is fighting for self-preservation.
Professor Cox would restrict the Independent Counsel Statute to
addressing the very sort of situation that caused its adoption. Whatever
lessons have been learned through experience with the Independent
Counsel Statute, Professor Cox urges that those lessons not obscure the
hard-learned lesson of Watergate.
Lloyd N. Cutler Two-time White House Counsel Lloyd N. Cutler
expressed support for renewal of the Independent Counsel Statute with
some significant changes. 2 In his remarks at the Symposium, Mr.
Cutler, an early supporter of the independent counsel mechanism, said
he believes the statute is in the best interests of the nation despite some
"second thoughts" based on his experiences in the Clinton White
House.1 3 According to Mr. Cutler, Watergate demonstrated the
problem of allocating the power of prosecutorial discretion to the
Attorney General: "The Attorney General's appearance of impartiality
and independence is simply gone for our generation."0 4
While his second thoughts have not caused him to oppose renewal of
the Independent Counsel Statute, they have caused him to propose
changes that would increase the power of the administration in deciding
when to appoint an independent counsel and provide a greater role in
deciding who will be appointed.'
He would also place a one year time
limit on investigations, subject to extension for cause. 0 '
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With respect to the triggering mechanism, Mr. Cutler would expand
the Attorney General discretion to use subpoenas and other investigative
techniques now forbidden during the preliminary investigation.0 7 He
would expand the discretion of the Attorney General by raising the
threshold for requesting the appointment of an independent counsel.'0 8
He suggests a standard such as "reasonable grounds for believing that
a significant federal crime may have been committed.""° Mr. Cutler
criticizes the existing scheme, which denies the Attorney General
common investigative tools and then asks whether further investigation
is warranted, as creating too low a threshold.
Mr. Cutler also proposes to give the administration a measure of
discretion in the appointment of independent counsel. He is critical of
the current scheme that gives discretion to a panel of judges, citing a
lack of confidence in the panel's appointments and a perception of
politicalization of the panel."' Mr. Cutler suggests creating a standing panel of possible independent counsel nominated by the President
and confirmed by the Senate. When an independent counsel is
requested, the court would select from those on the panel.'' In the
alternative, Mr. Cutler suggests creating an office of Public Prosecutor
for investigating public officials. He contends that either of these plans
would increase public confidence in the persons selected to serve.'
Lawrence E. Walsh. Former Iran-Contra Independent Counsel
Lawrence E. Walsh endorses the renewal of the Independent Counsel
Statute with some modifications."' Judge Walsh believes that the
institution of the independent counsel is needed to address the conflict
of interest that disqualifies the Attorney General and the Department
of Justice from investigating allegations of wrongdoing by the President
and other top officials of the executive branch." 4 Judge Walsh is open
to narrowing the coverage of the statute to a small group of senior
officials and to investigations of crimes committed while in office or in
seeking office."' But with respect to the the investigation of this
narrowed category of cases, Judge Walsh is a believer in the value of
independent counsel. The Independent Counsel Statute addresses the

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 469-70.
Id.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 477-78.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 465-67.
Id.
Id. at 473-74.

1998]

SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION

both
conflict of interest problem by disqualifying the Attorney General
16
from the case and from appointing the independent counsel.
Judge Walsh is also open to some modification in the triggering
mechanism to give the Attorney General more discretion." 7 He favors
giving the Attorney General subpoena power to gather information
during the preliminary investigation, but is leery of giving too much
investigative authority to the Attorney General during this phase
because of the risk that the preliminary investigation would spoil the
prospects for a successful prosecution. For this reason, he is opposed to
allowing the Attorney General to grant immunity to anyone during a
preliminary investigation." 8
Judge Walsh also zealously defends the need to preserve the independence of the independent counsel once there is an appointment. He
opposes, for example, any artificial time limit on investigations even if
extensions for cause were possible. Judge Walsh contends that a time
limit would give the discretion to terminate an investigation to a court
ill-equipped to make the decision." 9 On this issue of the independence
of the independent counsel, Judge Walsh presents a very different
perspective than critics of the statute. He describes "the isolation of the
independent counsel," who with a small staff finds himself at odds with
the government: "All of a sudden you find it is all against you, that the
old alliances have not changed a bit." 2 ° Judge Walsh also finds the
power of the independent counsel limited by the financial reporting
requirements, the press, negative public opinion, Department of Justice
policies, the Attorney General's removal power, and the court's mandate
For Judge Walsh, the
concerning the scope of the investigation.'
independent counsel is sufficiently restrained from the abuse of
prosecutorial power in its positive aspect. His desire to preserve the
institution of the independent counsel is based on the same concern that
motivated the original passage of the law: the fear of the abuse of
prosecutorial power in its negative aspect resulting in the undermining
of the rule of law."
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CONCLUSION

During the coming year, the future of the Independent Counsel
Statute will be decided by the Congress and the President. The
participants in the Symposium voiced diverse perspectives concerning
the future of the statute and how best to confront the dilemma of
allocating the power of prosecutorial discretion. Their views will help to
inform the debate over the future of the statute. In the short time since
the Symposium, Attorney General Janet Reno refused to request an
independent counsel to investigate campaign finance, 1" the jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr was expanded to include
allegations of perjury and obstruction of justice in the Paula Jones civil
suit, an indictment was returned against former HUD Secretary Henry
Cisneros, an independent counsel was appointed to investigate Secretary
of the Interior Bruce Babbitt concerning allegations of perjury, and a
preliminary investigation has begun to determine whether to appoint an
independent counsel to investigate Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman.
These developments serve to remind us of the enormous importance of
the outcome of the debate over the Independent Counsel Statute, a
debate that will determine who wields prosecutorial power and under
what conditions.

123.

See Symposium, supra note 33, at 482-84.

